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Second generation expert systems, 
explanations, arguments and archaeology 
Arthur Stutf 
In this paper I present a new approach to the design of expert systems in archaeology. 
An attempt is made to respond to the criticisms voiced by the potential users of such 
expert systems with a system which is flexible, natural and non-intrusive. This is 
achieved by using stylized argument exchange as the central paradigm for the system. 
The approach is illustrated in terms of a design for a program—the Argument Support 
Program for Archaeology (ASPA). 
In recent years workers such as Huggett, Baker and Reilly at the Research Centre 
for Computer Archaeology have eloquently voiced concerns about the use of expert 
systems by archaeologists (Huggett 1985, Huggett & Baker 1985, Baker 1986, Baker 
1988, Reilly 1985). 
These researchers mention several problems they have encountered or foresee with 
the introduction of expert systems in archaeology. The problems range from lack of 
awareness on the part of the potential user, through the inadequacy of present expert 
systems, to the possible theoretical changes which may be brought about by the use of 
expert systems. In the past many expert system researchers have attempted to solve the 
problem of user resistance to expert systems by extending the explanation capabilities 
of these systems in order to give the user a more perspicuous view of the system's 
reasoning. This solution is woefully inadequate if only because it fails to take account 
of what is perhaps the predominant difficulty raised by the criticisms of Huggett and 
others i.e. the possibiUty that users fail to make use of expert systems not because they 
cannot adequately assess the reasoning used by the system but because they feel that 
the use of such systems is detrimental at a theoretical level to the proper operation of 
their discipline. I will concentrate on three problems here: 
1. The formalization problem i.e. an inadequate model of an area of archaeological 
expertise may be used. 
the degree of formalization necessary to construct an expert system 
is a form of reductionism, in that the translation of knowledge from the 
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implicit to the explicit will inevitably involve the loss of elements in the 
process [Huggett 1985, p. 135] 
2. Thefossilization problem i.e. the domain knowledge contained in the expert system 
may come to be regarded as fixed and complete. 
... expert systems potentially present the additional hazard of fossilising 
the 'particular conceptual framework' that was current at the time of the 
abstraction... Archaeological knowledge is in a state of constant flux: 
systematising that knowledge could have serious implications for its 
future development, [ibid] 
3. The problem of the partially non-deductive nature of archaeological reasoning. 
The formal, fundamentally deductive reasoning of an expert system 
may be inapplicable when dealing with some types of archaeological 
problem... [ibid] 
I suggest in this paper that one possible solution to these worries lies in the introduc- 
tion of what has been called second generation expert systems (Steels 1987). Such systems 
can be distinguished from earlier expert systems in three ways (a) in their mode of 
interaction with the user (b) in the sorts of knowledge representation formalisms they 
use and (c) in their capacity to learn. In what follows 1 will concentrate on the mode 
of interaction which, in my opinion, determines both how knowledge is represented 
and what is learnt. 
Recently a paradigm has begun to emerge which promises a more integrated frame- 
work for the design of interfaces for expert systems. In this paradigm there is as much 
symmetry as possible between the operations that the user and system can perform. 
I shall introduce two main types of second generation expert system interaction—the 
critiquing model and the cooperative model. As an extension of these I propose the 
notion of arguing expert systems (AES). The AES approach incorporates a more natural 
framework than either of its immediate precursors in that explanation is integrated 
into the stylized argument exchanges which can occur between the user and the sys- 
tem. Thus, in the AES approach, both user and system can be called upon to give 
explanations or justifications during an exchange. 
The Argument Support Program for Archaeology (ASPA)—which is described in this 
paper and is currently being implemented as part of my PhD research—is particularly 
suited to non-formalized domains such as archaeology and other areas of the humani- 
ties. This is because it embodies a model of a means of acquiring knowledge through 
argument which, while it is pervasive throughout our academic and, indeed, non- 
academic culture, has greatest application in the humanities. ASPA, in brief, attempts to 
model the colleague in the office next door on whom you try out your ideas and from whom 
you expect useful, informed and sustained criticism and suggestions. Since the humanities 
lack the hard scientific evidence provided by experiment in the physical sciences, these 
sorts of exchanges are important. Archaeology itself falls somewhere between a science 
and a humanity. However, given the paucity of the physical remains of our forebears, 
archaeology requires argumentation if it is to give structure and meaning to the facts 
unearthed in excavation. 
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In this paper I will look briefly at the history of explanation and the nature of 
critiquing and cooperative expert systems. I will then delineate the main features of 
ASPA and end with a discussion of archaeological reasoning and archaeological theory 
and the relevance to these of the approach represented by ASPA. 
23.1     Explanation, argunnent, critiquing and cooperation. 
The attempt to add 'explanation' capabilities to expert systems has been pursued since 
at least the mid-seventies. The Mycin expert system (Buchanan & ShortUffe 1984) for 
the diagnosis of bacterial infections incorporated facilities for answering VJhy? and 
Hew? questions about the system's reasoning. Basically a W/ij/? question allows the 
user to query why a particular request has been made by the system whereas a How? 
question is a request for the chain of reasoning leading to some conclusion by the 
system. These facilities were incorporated into the Emycin shell which is a domain- 
independent version of Mycin and which is the prototype for many of the expert system 
shells currently available. Since these systems only provide a trace of the inferences 
the system makes, they remain largely unintelligible to the majority of users. There 
are also problems in suiting the explanations given to the abilities and knowledge of 
the particular user. Explanation facilities have improved only slightly over the past ten 
years although there has been much research on different approaches to the problem. 
These can be divided into those which concentrate on the development of new forms of 
representation of the target domain and the system's reasoning (Clancey 1983, Hasling 
et al 1984, Swartout 1983) and those which focus on producing a more human like 
exchange between the system and the user (Weiner 1980, Goguen et al 1983) although 
inevitably there is a great deal of overlap between them. The following two sections 
briefly describe examples of the latter which were influential in the development of the 
AES approach to the problem. 
23.1.1     The critiquing approach 
In simple terms an expert system designed in terms of the critiquing approach is one 
which, instead of offering a decision or piece of advice to the user, accepts the user's 
decision or plan and subjects it to critical evaluation. (Langlotz & Shortliffe 1983, Miller 
1983) The program will usually do this by comparing the user's decision or plan with 
its own and commenting on and/or explaining the significant differences between 
them. This goes some way towards obviating the second inadequacy mentioned in 
the previous paragraph since it is rendered more likely that the program will produce 
explanations which are relevant to the needs of the particular user. 
The critiquing approach does not on its own represent a solution to the problems of 
explanation. However, it is obvious that adequate explanations will not be forthcoming 
from an expert system unless this includes elements from the critiquing approach. 
This is because the critiquing approach at least renders the explanations it provides 
more suitable by focusing on the user's own plan, solution or diagnosis. One possible 
development would be a system where both the user and the system can provide and 
criticise plans or other recommendations and pursue lines of reasoning stemming from 
these. This is the underlying idea behind the cooperative approach. 
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23.1.2    The cooperative approach 
The cooperative approach embodies a shift in emphasis from a model of expert systems 
as Delphic oracles toward a more democratic model in which the system and the user 
act together to solve a problem. (Rector et al. 1985, Kidd 1985, Wordern et al. 1986, 
Knight 1986) This may involve, as in the suggestions of Kidd (Kidd 1985), a system 
which is capable of a process of negotiation in order to produce the best explanation 
in answering the user's query. 
The basic reason for the introduction of the cooperative model is the extreme re- 
luctance of users to accept expert systems. One possible means of overcoming this 
reluctance is to have a system which does not provide a once and for all answer but 
which cooperates with the user in performing some task. As part of the model, the 
decisions of the system can be overridden by the user in such a way that the system 
will take account of this in subsequent reasoning. In one sense the cooperative model 
can be seen as an extension of the critiquing model in that it is one function of an 
assistant to criticise the decisions of the person being assisted. A full assistant will 
however need to have knowledge not only about the domain but also about how this 
domain knowledge is organized as well as about the sorts of actions appropriate for 
an assistant. 
The chief interest of this research is in the alternative model of explanation it suggests. 
The explanation is situated in an ongoing cooperative exchange. During user and 
system cooperation in a task, the system provides explanations of its decisions and 
expects explanations of the user's decisions. 
The cooperative approach overcomes problems raised by inadequate explanations 
by allowing a two way exchange. Thus the focus of the exchange can be provided 
by either the system or the user. Unlike the critiquing approach the system can thus 
acquire as well as display knowledge and aid the user in articulating his or her reasons 
for some statement. As we shall see, the AES paradigm not only allows mixed initiative 
dialogues but also conducts these in terms of the sort of informal logic we make use 
of every day in forming and attacking arguments. 
23.1.3    The arguing expert systems approach 
The AES approach is an organic development of the critiquing and cooperative ap- 
proaches. An expert system exemplifying this approach can be seen as one which 
allows either the system or user to put forward explanations, plans or decisions in 
the form of arguments and expects the other to criticise these by finding weaknesses 
or alternative arguments. The system can acquire new knowledge by changing its 
knowledge base in the face of strong user arguments. The main differences between it 
and the cooperative approach are i) that a system based on this paradigm is constrained 
to being an assistant in one task—the production of arguments; ii) the exchange of 
beUefs and their rationales between the system and the user is sustained in an exchange 
which simulates as closely as possible an argument between human participants. 
Explanation is thus viewed as having its rightful place within an ongoing argument 
exchange. Either side in the exchange can be expected to produce an explanation. 
Conversely, either side can use this explanation as a means of acquiring new knowledge. 
The AES approach thus integrates knowledge acquisition and the display of expertise. 
This integration in itself goes some way towards the solution of the formalization and 
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fossilization problems mentioned above since the archaeologist user of the system can 
convince the system that it must integrate new knowledge into its knowledge base. 
23.2   Argument support programs 
An argument support program (based on the AES approach) is a system which com- 
bines many of the ideas from the critiquing and cooperative models with notions from 
informal logic (Toulmin et al. 1979), studies of dialogue (Reichman-Adar 1984) and 
work on the computational modelling of argumentation (Flowers et al. 1982, Alvarado 
^t al. 1986, Cohen 1987). In designing ASPA, I have also been influenced by the work of 
J-C Gardin and his colleagues (Gardin 1980, Gardin et al. 1987). The result is a model 
of a system in which there is greater symmetry between the operations possible for the 
user and the system. For instance, as in the critiquing model, either the user or the 
system can put forward a point of view with 'ts accompanying rationale. Unlike the 
critiquing model a sustained debate can then ensue in which either side can provide 
supporting, attacking or alternative arguments or make requests for clarification of 
grounds, explanations or factual information. ASPA, while acting as an assistant in 
the development of an argument, will nonetheless make every attempt to overturn the 
user's argument. This is because: (a) the system must have good reasons for changing 
its mind and (b) the best way to develop an argument is to have an opponent who 
adopts the opposing point of view. 
Ii> the remainder of this section I will present (i) a general model for an argument 
support program and (ii) a sketch of the design for a particular program which 
embodies the model. 
23.2.1    The model 
If an exchange between two participants is to be regarded as an argument it must have 
at least the following components. Human argument exchanges will include other 
components some of which, such as common sense knowledge, are not easily captured 
on a computer. 
• Argument is an exchange between two or more participants. As such it must 
have a symbolic medium capable of sustaining at least an approximation to natural 
language interchanges. 
• An argument, like other conversations, is composed of moves (cf. Reichman- 
Adar 1984). A move being a description of a chunk of the interchange which is 
described in terms of the purpose of the agent instigating the move. For instance, 
during the course of an argument, a participant will attempt to defend a claim 
s/he has made by means of a support move. 
• These moves have rules which govern whether or not they are regarded as legal 
by the participants. 
• Participants take turns. In any well ordered debate an implicit mechanism for 
turn taking will be in operation. 
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Figure 23.1: An argument network 
• During a move an argument step is produced. By argument step I mean the set 
of related propositions which make up the contents of a move in an argument 
exchange. An argument step is composed of a claim with supporting grounds. 
Grounds can be related to claims by warrants or derivation rules drawn from 
common sense or accepted as conventional in the particular domain. The warrant 
can be given a backing or statement of provenance or authority (Toulmin et al. 
1979). 
An argument exchange or debate is composed of a sequence of these steps which 
may be spread over several turns in the argument. There are relations of support 
or attack between the claims of previous and subsequent steps. The exchange can 
be represented diagrammatically as in Fig. 23.1 (in which 'u-c-1' stands for user- 
claim-1, 'u-g-1' for user-ground-1 and so on). Here an exchange is represented in 
which the user puts forward and justifies a claim which is attacked by the system 
with an argument fully supported by reasons and with a warrant and backing. 
The user responds by attacking one of the system's grounds, whereupon the 
system retaliates by finding further support for this ground. 
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- One of the participants can ^v^n the argument. This should result in a change 
in the beliefs of the loser. Since we are not ideal reasoners ,t is rarely the 
case that human/human arguments have this result. 
- If a participant can win/lose, s/he can also have stratégies or plans which rep- 
resent a means to the goal of winning. Conversely the other participant can 
have counter-plans which attempt to subvert those of h,s or her antagonist. 
- Again, if there are to be winners and losers, there must be a means of assessing 
the strength of the overall argument. 
- Arguments can be said to represent the viewvoint of the arguer. They are also 
frequently argued from some other point of view adopted for some specific 
occasion or in responding to a particular antagonist. 
- It is possible to distinguish different types o/ argument depending on the 
type of reasoning involved. Thus we have deductive, causal and analogical 
arguments. Most arguments, however, are composed of mixtures of the 
different types of reasoning. 
- Humans commit to memory at least the gist of arguments, standard patterns 
of argument for a discipUne and good arguments. 
While the above are necessary components for an arguer, various compromises and 
elaborations have had to be made when designing a viable system, as we shall see m 
the next section. 
23.2.2   The program-ASPA 
ASPA (see Fig. 23.2) is being implemented in Prolog on a Macintosh Plus "^crocom- 
Puter and is composed of two main modules: (a) the argument module and b the 
underlying knowledge base. An earlier version of the design is described in Stutt 1987. 
23.2.2.1     The argument module 
This is made up of a series of procedural components, which realize the model men- 
tioned above, and an associated knowledge base. The principal procedural components 
are for control, user argument parsing, user argument checking, system argument 
generation and overall argument assessment. At the heart of the system is the reasoner 
which can draw upon an inference engine to produce or assess arguments which can 
be either deductive or analogical (using a version of Centner s structure mapping 
theory (Centner 1983)).   The system also includes system and user viewpoints and 
a means of switching between them (cf.    Weiner 1980).    Each separate user has a 
user viewpoint which is stored in a file.    The system knowledge base consists of 
knowledge about general and domain-dependent argument strategies (cf.   Alvarado 
et al 1986, Reichman-Adar 1984), previously successful arguments and knowledge o 
how to assess an argument. The system also contains an argument net composed of 
frame-like nodes for storing the argument as it proceeds (cf. Flowers et al    982 which 
can be used to display the current state of the argument (texhially or graphically). 
A naive top-level strategy for dealing with another participant's argument can be 
illustrated by the following: 
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ASPA 
Argument module 
(Control 
User argument  parsing 
User  argument  checking 
System   argument   generation 
Overall   argument   assessment 
Figure 23.2: ASPA—the system 
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Attack the other's claim or Attack the other's grounds or Defend your own 
claim or Defend your own grounds or Attack the other s reasomng or Fmd 
another argument. 
However, one of the main data structures in the system, argument scripts ca- be used 
to focus the system's reasoning. A script is here taken as ^^^-^f yP/^^J .^^^^^"?";,'^°^ 
possible steps in an argument exchange. There are three mam sorts «^ ^^"P^^ f J ^^s 
scripts, responses-to-argument-type scripts and known-argument scripts. These scnpts 
are used by the system as short-cuts in understanding user arguments ^^d as ^ ^^^^ 
of selecting an appropriate response (cf.    the 'argument units   of Alyarado rt a . 
1986). Strategy scripts are used as a means of high-level control, ^e^P°"^^-*°-^''S^X', 
type scripts provide responses to tokens from the broad classes of argument which 
the system knows about, and known-argument scripts store previously successhil 
arguments. 
At the end of the argument, if the system loses, the system view will "^ed to be 
revised resulting in possible changes to the domain knowledge base and the knowledge 
base of scripts. During the exchange the system may decide, on the basis of subsequent 
user arguments, that ifs reconstruction of the user's viewpoint has been erroneous. This 
will necessitate changes to the user view and concomitant changes to the argument-net 
The central operations performed by the system are argument generation, argument 
step checking and overall argument evaluation: 
• Argument generation is performed by transforming the proof '[^^^l^^X^,^ 
rulf interpreter which makes derivations using facts and rules abou  the dom 
or assum'ptions derived from ^^^^^^^^h"^^^ 
further reduced by a set of «f ^^^'«"^^^^^^^^^ Js'r and (b) produce the best 
on similar transformations of tree structures, lu. c ^ 
1980, Goguen et al 1983). 
1    . , r^rr.rp<;<; wherebv the system must attempt to 
. Argument step checkmg involves a Process ^her^^^ y ^^ ^^^^^ 
bridge any gap between the ^^'^^^^^^Z^iT^o e.^Xy state all of the 
Cohen 1987) has pointed out, most arguments \    J fhp „cpr's argument 
artnjpr's r^remises    The system must therefore reconstruct the users argument 
arguer s premises,   ine sysie derivations from what the user 
using the domain knowledge base or again Dy aerivauu 
can be held to believe. 
11     ^,rv>pr.h ic: governed by a notion of the 'strength 
• The assessment of the overall argument is governeu   y ctrenPth of 
Of an argument'. The f-^tb ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
each individual step. ^"'^^" ^J'^^t/^^^for grounds^f. Cohen 1987) and b) the 
the relation between claim and ^^f^^'llJ^    ^ The current version of 
DprHnpnrp nf the current claim to tne oveian aiguii «i pertinence ot tne current „oint-scoring method for successhil supporting the program depends on a simple point scouib f-f 
and attacking argument steps. 
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l'Un     The archaeological knowledge base 
This is a fairly standard fact and rule knowledge base which can contain knowledge 
about any domain either within or without archaeology. In the current version the 
system knows about the modern Crée Indian site written about by Bonnichsen (Bon- 
nichsen 1973) in his paper 'Millie's Camp: an experiment in archaeology'. The user can- 
consult a graphical display of the camp and then engage the system in an argument 
about the mterpretation of the site at various levels ranging from the identification and 
use of the various activity areas to an overall interpretation of the site use. 
A viable version of the system would have to contain many such individual knowl- 
edge bases so that arguments can be conducted not only within and across viewpoints 
on one domain but within and across different domains. My next step will be to add 
for example, a knowledge base about a mesolithic hunter gatherer site so that the 
system can cope with arguments by analogy between the two domains. 
By means of these components the system functions as a tool which can 
• store a user's argument over time 
• check it for internal consistency and with prior user arguments 
• allow the user to mix reasoning types 
• provide good arguments 
• act as a tutor for what counts as a good argument generally and in a particular 
domain ^ 
One final use of the system implicit in the above is as a means of testing the effect on 
a pattern of argumentation of certain changes in knowledge. This will often happen in 
archaeology where new discoveries are happening all the time 
In the next section I will briefly consider the nature of archaeological reasoning and 
theory and how a system of the sort described above could, in practice, begin to answer 
the objections mentioned in the introduction. 
23.3   Archaeological reasoning and archaeological theory. 
It seems reasonable to take the view that (a) archaeology is a semi-formal discipline 
m which the form of reasoning used is plausible rather than deductive and (b) theorv 
m such a discipline is not fixed. This section will i) discuss the analogical nature of 
archaeologica reasoning and how ASPA copes with it and ii) suggest that archaeology 
at present makes use of more than one one body of theory and show how ASPA mav 
accommodate this aspect of the discipline. 
23.3.1     Analogy 
Archaeology makes extensive use of analogical argument. Other domains also make 
use of analogical reasoning in the production of hypotheses. However given the 
paucity of the data available to the archaeologist, analogy perhaps plays a'larger part 
here than m most domains. ^-   r   / b    F^''- 
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While analogy is used frequently in archaeology, because of the bad press it gets from 
philosophers, archaeologists have always been uneasy about this use. Thus on the one 
hand we have the sub-field of ethnoarchaeology (Stiles 1977) which is concerned to 
make use of analogies between the culture of hving peoples and those of prehistoric 
date. On the other hand Gould (Gould & Watson 1982) argues strongly that such 
analogies are suspect: 
Ethnographic analogies may be plausible and potentially testable, but they 
are often unscientific and are sometimes hard to distinguish from wishful 
thinking. 
Wylie (Wylie 1987) has put forward suggestions which attempt (a) to make the use 
of analogy in archaeology more viable and thus (b) overcome the fears of writers like 
Gould. She argues that analogy is given its viability by being grounded in deductive 
reasoning: 
The conclusion I draw concerning these general arguments is that although 
analogical inference certainly comprises a loosely defined type of inference 
strategy, it does not seem plausible that its warrant is as analogical. Its 
warrant is that it approximates, to one degree or another, a valid inference 
from general knowledge of determining structures that link known and 
inferred properties. [Wylie 1987, p. 5] 
In this view analogical argument derives its validity from possible corresponding 
deductive arguments which make use of 'determining structures'. I take these to be 
much the same as the second order relations mentioned by Gentner (Gentner 1983) 
(and Hodder's 'relational analogies' (f-Iodder 1982)). These structure or constrain the 
first order relations of potential analogues. An example would be a second order 
attribute such as leadsJolhasjivealth(person), hasxxpensiveJburial(person)] which expresses 
the notion, true of some societies, that the having of great wealth leads to the displaying 
of it after death. An analogy between two cases would be more powerful if it could be 
shown that the first level relations or attributes (such as 'has_wealth') were generally 
constrained by second level relations (such as 'leads_to'). Thus it could be argued, by 
analogy with a contemporary culture in which the leadsJo relation is true, that since 
the prehistoric culture shows evidence for expensive funeral rites therefore this culture 
contained individuals with large amounts of accumulated wealth which was expressed 
in their funerary monuments. If this is what Wylie means, then it seems unlikely 
that such general constraints will be found. We could easily imagine occasions where 
wealth is not expressed in the above manner and, on the other hand, where expensive 
funeral rites are carried out for poor individuals (e.g. Gandhi). 
Nonetheless, although analogies may not have a deductive grounding it is still 
possible, using Centner's approach, to render them computationally tractable. The 
process of creating the rules for 'good' analogies explicit should be of interest to 
archaeologists. 
23.3.2    Archaeological theory 
Leaps of faith are necessarily made since much of what archaeologists 
reconstruct is unobservable (Hodder 1984). 
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Given the prevalence of non-deductive forms of reasoning in archaeology in its 
attempt to make what Hodder (Hodder 1984) calls 'leaps of faith' to the proper interpre- 
tation of the data available, it is obvious that archaeological theory will not correspond 
to the sets of propositions (or equations) with relations of logical or mathematical 
implication applicable to 'hard' sciences such as physics. Archaeology as an interpretive 
discipline will have theories which are more concerned with shedding light on some 
particular object or site than with general laws. Thus archaeology will make use of 
currently fashionable theories such as structuralism and marxism in order to provide 
a theoretical viewpoint on the data. 
ASPA, through its mechanism for modelling several different points of view, could 
be used to model different interpretive theories as sets of facts plus their interpretive 
transformations and strategies for composing these. 
23.4   Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are four main reasons why such a program should be of interest 
to archaeologists: 
1. In its knowledge acquisition role, ASPA answers, in part, the sorts of high level 
criticisms raised in the introductory section. The program has three principle 
features which enable it to obviate these difficulties: 
(a) The user can change the domain knowledge base by providing a convincing 
argument for any new claim whether this be about facts or the relations 
between facts contained in rules. This has the effect of modifying the 
theoretical viewpoint reflected in the knowledge base by modifying how 
the knowledge is structured and manipulated and allows the user to change 
the knowledge base in a principled manner. 
(b) The system can employ different viewpoints on the facts of the domain thus 
allowing the user to model the domain from various quasi-theoretical points 
of view. 
(c) The system can understand arguments which are based on non-deductive 
forms of inference, in particular, on analogical reasoning. 
2. Archaeology is an argumentative discipline. Since material finds are so scarce, it is 
inevitable that if the archaeologist is to go beyond the mere cataloguing of finds 
then arguments pro and contra certain interpretations or theoretical positions 
will be rife. This can be illustrated by the work of a prehistorian like Richard 
Bradley (Bradley 1984) or the theoretical discussions of Ian Hodder (Hodder 1986). 
ASPA, as an argument generator as well as checker, can aid in the production 
and appraisal of arguments at many levels. Furthermore, ASPA has the ability 
to create and comprehend arguments which are either completely or partially 
non-deductive. At the moment this is confined to analogical reasoning but 
future versions will include other forms of plausible reasoning as well as causal 
reasoning. ASPA also includes the capacity to argue across differing viewpoints 
thus offering the possibility of the integration of multiple viewpoints. 
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Bradley (Bradley 1984) or the theoretical discussions of Ian Hodder (Hodder 1986). 
ASPA, as an argument generator as well as checker, can aid in the production 
and appraisal of arguments at many levels. Furthermore, ASPA has the ability 
to create and comprehend arguments which are either completely or partially 
non-deductive. At the moment this is confined to analogical reasoning but 
future versions will include other forms of plausible reasoning as well as causal 
reasoning. ASPA also includes the capacity to argue across differing viewpoints 
thus offering the possibility of the integration of multiple viewpoints. 
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3. Hodder (Hodder 1982) and others have discussed the importance of analogi- 
cal reasoning in archaeology. Because of its non-deductive nature this sort of 
reasoning has been frowned upon by many philosophers and hence by many 
archaeologists. If Hodder is right, then archaeologists cannot avoid the use of 
analogical reasoning. What they must do, however, is to apply it in as strict 
and principled a fashion as possible. One means of imposing this strictness and 
discipline is by making the rules for analogical reasoning explicit in the form of 
pieces of Prolog code and utilizing these to generate and evaluate arguments. 
4. In most expert systems used in archaeology the knowledge involved is confined 
to certain facts about some domain and heuristics for making use of these facts. 
ASPA, as it develops as a means of capturing and engaging in more theoretical 
arguments, will of necessity reveal certain characteristic patterns of reasoning 
which the archaeologist makes use of in interpreting sites and evaluating the 
theories of other archaeologists. 
If nothing else, I hope to draw archaeologist's attention to the possibilities inherent in 
the sorts of ideas embodied in the currently proposed models for expert systems. I hope 
I have also supported the notion that an arguing expert system would be of value in an 
archaeological context. In particular I hope that I have shown that such a system could 
overcome the problems of formalization, fossilization and non-deductive reasoning 
"mentioned in the introduction. It would hardly be surprising if a system which could 
really argue (and I recognise that ASPA only approximates to one) would be of help in 
the formulation of ideas in archaeology. Argument conceived as the critical interchange 
of ideas is something which underlies all of our academic discourse. A system which 
embodies an arguer will be one which does not deliver oracular pronouncements from 
some centre of excellence but which allows the individual archaeologist to express 
as forcibly as possible an individual view on the artifact assemblages and structures 
revealed during excavation. 
In short, ASPA integrates expert system explanation and knowledge acquisition in 
a model for user/system interaction in archaeology which is natural (because archae- 
ologists make extensive use of argumentation), non-intrusive (no theory of the domain 
is imposed by the AI program) and flexible (the knowledge base can be altered via 
argument exchanges). Thus, although ASPA remains a partially implemented research 
tool, it has much to interest the archaeologist. 
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